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The Cost of Risk to the Government 
and Its Implications for Federal 
Budgeting
Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
3.1    Introduction
The idea of “state prices”—that the value today of a dollar in future 
purchasing power depends on the future state of nature—dates back to 
the classic work of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959) and is the 
basis for most neoclassical theories of asset valuation used today. It oﬀers an 
explanation for why some securities, such as common stocks and risky loans, 
earn an expected return in excess of the risk-  free rate: these securities tend 
to have high payoﬀs when the economy is strong and low payoﬀs when the 
economy is weak. Since dollars received in good times are worth less in utility 
terms than in bad times (a result of decreasing marginal utility of wealth), 
the price of a risky security is less than its expected payoﬀ discounted at the 
risk-  free rate. Equivalently, its expected return is higher than the risk-  free 
rate; there is a market risk premium.
While it is widely accepted that investors require a market risk premium, 
it is less established that market risk should be treated as a cost to the Fed-
eral Government. In practice, the price of risk is almost entirely absent 
from federal budgeting. This omission makes federal credit and some 
insurance programs appear to cost less than their market value, thereby 
favoring such assistance over alternatives that are accounted for at mar-
ket prices. It also gives federal investments in risky securities ﬁ  nanced 
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with Treasury debt the appearance of generating free money for the 
government.
In this chapter, we revisit the question of the cost of risk to the Federal 
Government and its implications, both conceptual and practical, for federal 
budgeting. We begin in section 3.2 with a brief review of the academic litera-
ture that speaks directly to the cost. We then review the economic case for 
treating market risk as a legitimate cost and consider how this conclusion is 
aﬀected by considerations such as the government’s ability to increase risk 
pooling, to transfer resources across generations, and in general, to reduce 
credit market imperfections.
In section 3.3, after brieﬂ  y describing the current budget treatment of 
credit, insurance, and investments in private securities, we present the 
“budgetary case” for including the cost of market risk in budget esti-
mates. This requires an understanding of what budget estimates are used 
for and also of their limitations. In the debate over whether the cost of 
risk should be incorporated into budget estimates, an important but often 
overlooked observation is that the budget records only costs, not beneﬁ  ts. 
The question of whether it is socially optimal for the government to make 
a particular investment is distinct from the question of whether including 
the market cost of risk in budget estimates improves their usefulness to 
policymakers. Certainly, budget cost is an input into cost-  beneﬁ  t analy-
ses of policies, but assessing beneﬁ  ts requires nonbudget information as 
well. To the extent that budget estimates have an allocative eﬀect, it is 
because of aggregate spending limits, and because they are used to make 
comparisons between diﬀerent types of expenditures that satisfy a given 
policy objective. To make such constraints and comparisons meaningful, 
budget accounting aims to price alternative expenditures in consistent 
units of cost. Since the government generally procures other goods and 
services at market prices, considerations of consistency and transparency 
favor using market values in budgeting for ﬁ  nancial obligations as well. 
Alternatives for measuring and accounting for market risk in govern-
ment transactions—and some of the practical diﬃculties involved—are 
also discussed.
Even if, in principle, market risk should be included in budget estimates, 
whether it is worthwhile to modify budgeting practice depends on whether 
the potential improvements are material. A number of academic studies—
including several in this volume and a series of academic papers and stud-
ies by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO)—provide some evidence 
on the magnitudes involved. Those ﬁ  ndings, reviewed in section 3.4, show 
that the distortions from neglecting the price of risk in some cases have 
been considerable and suggest that investing in the capacity to provide 
this information to lawmakers through the budget process is likely to be 
worthwhile.The Cost of Risk to the Government    3 1
3.2      Cost of Risk to the Government
3.2.1    The  Early  Debate
The question of the cost of risk to the government received considerable 
attention in the mid-   to late 1960s and early 1970s, but much less has been 
written on the topic since then.1 Academic interest during that period arose 
naturally from recent advances in general equilibrium theory—particularly 
the contributions of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959). Those 
developments allowed more general welfare analyses of policy, underscored 
both the beneﬁ  ts of risk sharing and the aggregate limit on risk sharing, 
and clariﬁ  ed the role of market prices in aggregating the risk preferences 
of society.
In this vein, Diamond (1967) analyzed an economy with technology risk 
and a stock market. His conclusions regarding government investment can 
be paraphrased by saying that if markets are suﬃciently complete for stock 
prices to reﬂ  ect the social cost of risk, then those prices are also relevant 
to the government in evaluating its investment policy. In other words, the 
private cost of risk is a reasonable proxy for the social cost of risk and the 
right metric for evaluating government investment decisions. Hirshleifer 
(1964, 1966) reached similar conclusions and argued forcefully for the use 
of market prices.
A distinctly diﬀerent view of the cost of risk to the government was put 
forth by other leading economists of the time. In Jorgenson et al. (1964), 
Samuelson and Vickrey argue that because of the large and diversiﬁ  ed port-
folio held by the government, the marginal return from public investment 
overall is virtually risk free and hence should be evaluated at the risk- free rate 
rather than the higher market rate demanded by less diversiﬁ  ed individuals. 
In a very inﬂ  uential paper, Arrow and Lind (1970) formalize this argument. 
Speciﬁ  cally, they study a model with complete contingent claims (i.e., com-
plete insurance markets) and no aggregate uncertainty. They conclude that 
in this setting, the social and private discount rate is equated at the risk-  free 
rate. They further show that even when markets are incomplete, the cost of 
risk bearing to taxpayers goes to zero as the number of taxpayers becomes 
large and the share of risk borne by each diminishes.
Arrow and Lind acknowledge that these conclusions depend on the 
assumption that government investment entails no aggregate risk: “The 
results . . . depend on returns from a given public investment being indepen-
dent of other components of national income” (1970, p. 373). They defend 
this assumption as plausible, asserting that correlated risk is likely to be 
1. A notable exception is Bazelon and Smetters (1999), which also surveys some of the earlier 
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insigniﬁ  cant for many government investments. This is also noted by Sandmo 
(1972, p. 287), who writes that the Hirshleifer view can be reconciled with 
Arrow and Lind’s conclusions only by recognizing that
the two sets of arguments are based on entirely diﬀerent assumptions 
concerning the relationship between private and public investment with 
respect to risk. Arrow and Lind assume that the returns on private and 
public investment are uncorrelated; indeed this assumption is crucial for 
their main result. The Hirshleifer view, however, is clearly based on the 
assumption that for each type of public investment it is possible to ﬁ  nd a 
private industry such that the returns are highly correlated.
Sandmo goes on to suggest that for the modern economies of Europe 
and the United States, Hirshleifer’s view is likely the more plausible one. 
Interestingly, he observes that the contributions of Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), and Modigliani and Miller (1958)—a body of work that provides the 
underpinning of modern ﬁ  nancial economics—are highly relevant to this 
debate but rarely cited in the context of public investment.
A lively discussion of the closely related question of whether there is a 
well- deﬁ  ned social (risk-  free) discount rate and whether it can be gleaned 
from market prices was also occurring at that time (see Sandmo and Dreze 
[1971] and references therein). The rate of time preference reﬂ  ected in capi-
tal market prices—that is, Treasury rates—can lead to suboptimal govern-
ment investment decisions when markets are incomplete. Analyses of these 
issues led to the broad conclusion that in the presence of distorting taxes 
and various other sources of market incompleteness, there is not a unique 
rate of time preference appropriate for evaluating all pubic investments. As 
in the debate about market risk, a critical question that was left unresolved 
is whether it is possible to determine a better general rule than relying on 
market prices for choosing a discount rate.
3.2.2    The  Economic  Case
In this section, we brieﬂ  y revisit the arguments for and against using mar-
ket prices to evaluate risky government investment opportunities and review 
some more recent evidence from the ﬁ  nance literature that bears on the ques-
tion of whether, as Arrow and Lind posited, diversiﬁ  able risk is priced.
To explain the expected returns on risky assets, ﬁ  nancial economists often 
abstract from the general notion of state prices and describe risk as falling 
into two broad categories: nondiversiﬁ  able or market risk, and diversiﬁ  able 
or idiosyncratic risk. Market risk arises from ﬂ  uctuations in aggregate out-
put, which logically is inclusive of the eﬀects of government actions on the 
aggregate economy, including stabilization policy. Idiosyncratic risks, on the 
other hand, can in principle be avoided through insurance and other con-
tractual risk-  sharing arrangements and by portfolio diversiﬁ  cation. When The Cost of Risk to the Government    3 3
markets are complete, individual optimization eliminates idiosyncratic risk, 
and in equilibrium, only market risk is priced.
In terms of this decomposition of risk and return, evidence that idiosyn-
cratic risk is not priced in ﬁ  nancial markets supports Hirshleifer’s position 
that markets are suﬃciently complete for the government to rely on market 
prices. Conversely, evidence that idiosyncratic risk is priced supports Arrow 
and Lind’s argument. Speciﬁ  cally, Arrow and Lind conjecture that the rea-
son for the high rates of return on risky securities relative to the risk-  free 
rate—the market risk premium—is mainly compensation for these diversiﬁ  -
able risks rather than for aggregate or market risk. If government investment 
more eﬀectively diversiﬁ  es risk than does the private sector, using a market 
discount rate that includes compensation for diversiﬁ  able risk would result 
in systematic undervaluation of government investments.
Since the 1970s, numerous empirical studies have examined whether diver-
siﬁ  able risk is priced in ﬁ  nancial markets. Most cross-  sectional evidence on 
asset returns suggests that this risk is not priced. In particular, tests of the 
Sharpe and Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which decom-
poses asset returns into market and idiosyncratic components, show that 
idiosyncratic risk has little or no explanatory power for the cross-  section 
of stock returns. The CAPM, which equates market risk with the volatility 
of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 returns, has been criticized for its low 
explanatory power. However, tests of better performing multifactor alterna-
tives to the CAPM2 also provide little support for the idea that diﬀerences 
in idiosyncratic risk explain the cross-  section of returns (e.g., Fama and 
French 1992). These empirical ﬁ  ndings are consistent with the observation 
that even small investors can diversify ﬁ  nancial risk quite inexpensively—for 
instance, through mutual funds—and that most large investors hold fairly 
diversiﬁ  ed positions. This evidence weighs against the argument of Arrow 
and Lind that market prices overstate the cost of risk to the government 
because investors put excessive weight on diversiﬁ  able risk.
Some observers have also interpreted the equity premium puzzle—the 
inability of parameterized versions of standard neoclassical general equi-
librium models to account for the historically high average spreads between 
risky securities and short-  term Treasury rates—as evidence of capital mar-
ket imperfections. Attempts to explain the equity premium puzzle by appeal-
ing to individual risk exposure, however, have been largely unsuccessful (e.g., 
Heaton and Lucas 1996). In fact, the robust predictions of economic theory 
put very few quantitative restrictions on price levels or returns, suggesting 
that the observed equity premium is diﬃcult to interpret as evidence for or 
2. Testing for whether only aggregate risk is priced is complicated by the diﬃculty of ﬁ  nding 
an adequate empirical proxy. As famously noted by Roll (1977), the CAPM may appear to be 
rejected in tests, not because it is wrong, but because the proxies for the market return are not 
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against the eﬃciency of ﬁ  nancial markets in sharing risk. Hence, we view 
this literature as silent on the question of whether market prices deviate 
from social values.
Some (mostly nonacademic) observers have further suggested that market 
risk is not costly to the government, because the government can borrow at 
a risk- free Treasury rate. The problem with this reasoning is that the cost of 
debt ﬁ  nancing is only one component of the government’s cost of capital. 
When the government ﬁ  nances risky investments by selling safe Treasury 
securities, investment risk is shifted onto current and future taxpayers and 
other federal stake holders, who eﬀectively become equity holders in a lever-
aged investment.
Imagine, for instance, that the government ﬁ  nances an investment in com-
mon stock through the sale of Treasury securities. This is an exchange of 
ﬁ  nancial assets between the public and private sector that as a ﬁ  rst approxi-
mation should have no eﬀect on aggregate real investment or output. To be 
concrete, assume that the government borrows $100 to buy $100 in stock and 
will liquidate the entire position in one year. The Treasury securities promise 
5 percent risk free, whereas the stock will return– 2 percent in a recession and 
20 percent in a boom. Assuming an equal probability of a boom or a bust, 
the expected return on the stock is 9 percent, a 4 percent premium over the 
Treasury rate. At the end of the year, taxpayers are liable for repayment of 
the Treasury debt, regardless of whether the stock gains or loses value. In a 
recession, the government will be short $7—money that must be obtained 
from the public through expenditure cuts, higher taxes, or increased debt 
liabilities. In a boom, it will be ahead by $15, which again will be passed 
through to the public through changes in expenditures, taxes, or govern-
ment debt. This shows that the stock is not really entirely ﬁ  nanced by the 
Treasury debt. The public serves as the residual claimant of the return on 
the stock minus the Treasury rate; it is as if the public is a highly leveraged 
equity holder in the stock investment.
A taxpayer accepting the same risk in a private ﬁ  nancial transaction 
would expect compensation equal to the levered market risk premium to 
participate. In fact, the same transaction is readily available to the public 
without government intervention. An individual can sell $100 of Treasury 
securities and use the proceeds to invest $100 in the common stock. The 4 
percent increase in expected return is compensation for taking on the higher 
risk of the new portfolio, not an arbitrage gain.
The argument that the government cannot create value by exchanging 
safe for risky claims is an application to public ﬁ  nance of the well-  known 
Modigliani-  Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958). They show that 
in the absence of market imperfections, the cost of risk associated with 
an asset depends only on its own characteristics, not on the combina-
tion of ﬁ  nancial securities used to ﬁ  nance it. In our example, the value of 
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tion of Treasury securities and contingent public obligations used to fund 
the purchase.
3.2.3      Implications of Incomplete Markets
Notwithstanding the preceding arguments for the relevance of market 
prices, market incompleteness can complicate the evaluation of social costs 
and beneﬁ  ts for risky government investments.3 In this section, we discuss 
several ways in which incomplete markets complicate valuation, but we 
emphasize the strong case for using market prices to measure costs, even in 
the presence of incomplete markets.
A classic example of market incompleteness arises in credit markets, where 
informational asymmetries combined with weak enforcement mechanisms 
can cause markets to break down. For instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
consider a credit market with borrowers of mixed quality, where lenders 
cannot distinguish between borrower types. If lenders attempt to increase 
interest rates to make up for expected losses on bad credits, good borrowers 
leave the market, driving up the expected loss rate. In the extreme, no inter-
est rate clears the market at a nonnegative proﬁ  t to lenders. Private credit is 
rationed at a suboptimally low level relative to a “ﬁ  rst-  best” allocation.
When credit rationing occurs, it may be welfare improving for the gov-
ernment to intervene by making credit available.4 The federal student loan 
program, which provides credit for students who have little or no credit 
history and might not be able to obtain loans on their own, is an example 
of a government intervention thought to reduce such credit rationing. Of 
course, such interventions may not always improve welfare: credit subsidies 
will induce some people to borrow more than is socially desirable and can 
impose considerable costs on taxpayers. Since the marginal utilities of con-
strained borrowers are unobservable and likely to vary across individuals, 
it seems that evaluating the beneﬁ  ts from government credit programs will 
always include a subjective element.
Market incompleteness also complicates the evaluation of the cost of 
federal credit assistance. When private credit markets fail or when govern-
ment credit crowds out private credit provision, an appropriate market price 
may not be readily identiﬁ  able. In such cases, using the standard methods 
in ﬁ  nancial valuation discussed next, the cost—in terms of what markets 
(and presumably taxpayers) would demand for receiving the same state-
 contingent  payoﬀs from borrowers—can be found by projecting those 
payoﬀs on securities that are trading in ﬁ  nancial markets. This projection 
approach identiﬁ  es the amount of market risk embedded in the transaction 
3. Bohn (2004), for instance, examines the welfare eﬀects of alternative ﬁ  scal policies when 
market incompleteness is generated by imperfect risk sharing across generations.
4. Gale (1991) observes that when government credit simply substitutes for credit that would 
have otherwise been privately extended and hence has little eﬀect on real resource allocations, 
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and incorporates the price of market risk into the estimated cost to the gov-
ernment. For instance, one can infer the value of government student loans 
from market prices for unsecured consumer credit, and government credit 
guarantees to small businesses can be valued using information on similar, 
nonguaranteed bank loans to small ﬁ  rms. These examples illustrate that 
the absence of a market price does not preclude the existence of a similar 
private credit arrangement that can be used to infer market value. Further, 
the absence of an analogous private contract does not imply that a govern-
ment program will be exceptionally expensive or risky; rather, it reﬂ  ects the 
absence of a proﬁ  table private lending opportunity.
Future generations are not directly represented in current market trans-
actions, and some economists believe that this source of incompleteness 
causes too little weight to be placed on the welfare of future generations 
when future costs and beneﬁ  ts are discounted at market rates. That is, the 
social cost of long-  term federal liabilities and the social value of long-
  term public investments are both understated using market discount rates. 
This point of view, for example, was forcefully presented in Stern (2007). 
Others argue the opposite: because of investments made today and the 
fruits of technological progress, future generations will likely be better oﬀ, 
and hence it is optimal to incur liabilities that they will be at least partially 
responsible for.
How the competing interests of current and future generations should 
be weighed in public policy decisions is an important and diﬃcult prob-
lem but one that may be largely separable from the question of whether 
the market price of risk should be incorporated into federal budget esti-
mates. Kaplow (2006) develops a framework that formalizes the idea that 
the question of eﬃciency and of how much weight should be placed on 
diﬀerent generations can be separated. In his analysis, increasing eﬃciency 
is to the beneﬁ  t of all generations, and eﬃciency is properly assessed using 
market prices. To the extent that the purpose of the federal budget is to 
assist the government in making eﬃcient trade-  oﬀs at a point in time, the 
implication of his analysis is that market prices are appropriate for federal 
budgeting, even when generational welfare is assessed at a below-   or above- 
market rate.
It is important to note that if generational equity or other externalities 
cause one to seriously question the appropriateness of market prices for 
guiding government allocation decisions, these objections apply equally to 
the leading alternative for discounting government obligations: Treasury 
yields. Like the yields on risky securities, Treasury yields are determined 
by supply and demand in ﬁ  nancial markets and hence fail to capture any 
nonmarket notion of the correct social discount rate.
In general, market incompleteness can drive a wedge between market 
prices and social costs and beneﬁ  ts. This is true for noncredit as well as credit 
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prices in the case of budgeting for credit. Whether it is possible to improve 
upon market prices clearly will depend on the source and consequences 
of the market imperfection under consideration. We return to the issue of 
whether introducing risk adjustment in federal budgeting is likely to improve 
the allocative eﬃciency of the budget process in a second-  best world in 
section 3.3.2.
3.3      The Cost of Risk and the Federal Budget
To evaluate the pros and cons of including the cost of risk in federal 
budget estimates, it is ﬁ  rst necessary to understand the basic principles that 
govern budgetary accounting, and speciﬁ  cally the rules related to credit, 
insurance, and investments in private securities.5 It is also important to 
consider how Congress uses these estimates in making resource allocation 
decisions.
3.3.1    Federal  Budget  Accounting
The federal budget primarily relies on cash accounting to depict the cost 
of federal activities. This basis of accounting records federal costs in terms 
of net cash outlays in the year in which it occurs rather than when it accrues. 
The budget also includes projected outlays over a period of up to ten years. 
The out- year projections of cost receive less attention, however, because they 
do not aﬀect the current budget deﬁ  cit or surplus.
For certain long-  lived contractual obligations such as capital leases, 
interest on Treasury securities, and federal credit assistance, the budget has 
moved gradually away from pure cash accounting in favor of up-  front or 
capitalized accrual accounting. That treatment recognizes all projected pay-
ments associated with the obligation, even if some cash ﬂ  ows will occur 
outside the budget period. It also introduces discounting into budget cal-
culations, which raises the question of whether and how risk should be 
accounted for.
The fact that the budget is primarily on a cash rather than accrual basis 
can distort resource allocation decisions—for instance, by making rental 
appear less costly than capital investment, even when in present value terms, 
the capital investment is cheaper and the facility will be used indeﬁ  nitely. 
Accruals, however, require more assumptions about uncertain future cash 
ﬂ  ows, making them easier to manipulate. Assessing the pros and cons of 
cash versus accrual budgeting is beyond the scope of this analysis; we take 
the cash treatment of most expenditures as given. The main conclusions 
about risk adjustment, however, would appear to become even more impor-
tant were accruals more widely used in the budget.
5. Much of the discussion in this section is based on Lucas and Phaup (2008), which also 
includes a more detailed description of current and historical accounting practices.38        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
Loans and Loan Guarantees
Before 1990, the budget cost for federal credit activity was similar to that 
for most other programs—the net cash outﬂ  ows for the program in the 
ﬁ  scal year. The mix of cash ﬂ  ows included in the budget account made net 
outlays an inaccurate measure of cost. For existing programs, an increase 
in net outlays could result from increases in new lending, higher defaults 
on outstanding guarantees, legislated increases in debt forgiveness, or other 
factors. For new direct loan programs, the cost reported was not compre-
hensive and hence was also hard to evaluate. Cost included net outlays in 
the budget period but no oﬀset for expected repayments outside the budget 
window and no adjustment for time value. New guarantee programs were 
scored with few, if any, cash outﬂ  ows in the year the program began, because 
outlays for defaults usually occur a year or more after the loan is disbursed. 
In fact, new guarantees often had a negative cost because of the inﬂ  ow of 
guarantee fees early on. This accounting favored new guarantee programs 
over almost all alternatives intended to achieve the same policy objectives, 
including new direct loan programs.
The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) eﬀectively put credit 
on an accrual basis, with cost measured as the discounted value (at the 
maturity-  matched Treasury rate) of current-   and future-  period cash ﬂ  ows 
from budget-  period transactions. Its stated objectives were to: measure the 
cost of federal credit programs more accurately, place the cost of credit pro-
grams on a budgetary basis equivalent to other federal spending, encourage 
the delivery of beneﬁ  ts in the form most appropriate to the needs of beneﬁ  -
ciaries, and improve the allocation of resources among credit programs and 
between credit and other spending programs.
Although the FCRA was partially successful in meeting its objectives, it 
fell short of measuring cost in terms completely equivalent to cash spend-
ing. The largest discrepancy arises from the mandated use of interest rates 
on maturity-  matched US Treasury securities for discounting rather than 
a market-  based cost of capital that includes the cost of market risk.6 The 
understatement of cost is most evident in those programs that report a 
gain to the government while delivering credit at rates that are below those 
charged for credit of similar risk in competitive markets. In those cases, 
the budget creates a bias in favor of federal credit programs compared 
with noncredit assistance and encourages expansion of federal credit ser-
vices that can crowd out private provision of credit. Section 3.4 provides 
information on the likely size of the distortion for several federal credit 
programs.
6. The treatment of administrative costs, ﬂ  oating rate loans, and reestimates is also problem-
atic (CBO 2006b), but those issues are beyond the scope of this chapter.The Cost of Risk to the Government    3 9
Insurance
Insurance programs generally are budgeted for on a cash basis. For prop-
erty casualty coverage such as federal ﬂ  ood or crop insurance, this approach 
is consistent with the annual coverage period that is standard in private 
contracts. For such insurance programs, market risk is unlikely to repre-
sent a major cost. Programs such as deposit and pension insurance, how-
ever, also can be viewed as credit guarantees, although they are not covered 
by the FCRA. Deposit and pension insurance are distinguished from the 
types of transactions covered by the FCRA by their lack of a ﬁ  xed matu-
rity date. The market risk associated with these programs is not treated as a 
budget cost.
Investments in Private Securities
Despite their similarity to federal loans, federal investments in private 
securities (e.g., stocks, corporate bonds, mortgages, foreign securities) are 
not covered by the FCRA. Rather, such investments are generally accounted 
for under the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-  11, 
which directs agencies to account for investments in private equities on a 
cash basis. That is, such investments are reported as outlays when made, 
despite the oﬀsetting receipt of a security of equal value.
As for direct lending before the FCRA, scoring ﬁ  nancial investments as 
outlays tends to discourage such activity, and until recently, federal invest-
ments in private securities have been quite limited. The possibility of book-
ing a proﬁ  t, however, has inﬂ  uenced several proposals to increase federal 
investments in private securities, usually in the context of Social Security 
reform. The passage of the 2001 amendments to the Railroad Retirement 
Act was a notable step in this direction.
The railroad retirement system, which predates Social Security, provides 
two tiers of beneﬁ  ts to retired railroad workers and their dependents. The 
ﬁ  rst approximates beneﬁ  ts payable under Social Security. The second is 
speciﬁ  ed in the Railroad Retirement Act and is based on years of railroad 
employment. Both tiers are ﬁ  nanced by payroll taxes levied on employees 
and the railroads. The 2001 amendments authorized a newly created Na-
tional Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT) to invest in a diver-
siﬁ  ed portfolio of risky securities. Further, the legislation speciﬁ  ed that the 
purchase and sale of private securities by the Trust be treated in the budget 
as having no eﬀect on budget outlays or the deﬁ  cit. Only capital gains and 
losses were to be treated as aﬀecting outlays.
The Railroad Retirement Act posed new challenges to the CBO and the 
OMB. There was general agreement that booking the market risk premium 
as expected proﬁ  t, an oﬀset to program expenses, should be avoided. Oth-
erwise, the appearance of an arbitrage opportunity from selling Treasury 40        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
securities and buying risky securities would reward increased risk- taking and 
perhaps encourage increased spending from illusory resources. Consistent 
with the legislation, it was agreed that the outlay of cash for securities would 
be treated as an equal value exchange. Gains and losses would be recognized 
in budget net outlays (gains as negatives) only as incurred. Notably, Treasury 
rates of return were adopted for projecting budget baseline income for the 
railroad retirement system. This eﬀectively adjusts those returns for risk and 
avoids the appearance of a free lunch in budget projections.7
3.3.2      Risk as a Budgetary Cost
The federal budget serves multiple purposes: it is a record of and a partial 
check on total federal spending, and it allows trade-  oﬀs to be made among 
competing uses of resources. For the Congress, the budget resolution limits 
the budget costs that authorizing and appropriations committees can incur 
during a ﬁ  scal year. Those constraints create an incentive for the committees 
to choose policies that provide the greatest beneﬁ  t from the limited budget 
resources available. To make comparisons between policy alternatives mean-
ingful and to avoid accounting arbitrage opportunities, it is important that 
cost be recorded on a consistent basis.
The principle of consistency suggests the use of market prices in budget-
ing for federal ﬁ  nancial commitments. The reason is that almost all non-
credit transactions—including grants, purchases of goods, and the direct 
provision of services—appear in the budget at market prices. The largest 
category of expenditures is transfers. People get money, from Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts, food stamps, and so on. Cash is accounted for at its market price 
by deﬁ  nition—the real value of a dollar is what you can get by spending it 
on a consumption bundle. Then, there are government purchases from the 
private sector: military hardware, the labor of the federal workforce, build-
ings, computers, electricity, and so forth—all expenditures that occur at 
market prices, since goods, services, and capital are mostly purchased from 
private suppliers.
There are other categories of transactions where administrative prices 
appear to play a role, but ultimately, expenditures reﬂ  ect market values. 
For instance, administrative prices set limits on Medicare payments, but no 
doctor is conscripted to participate in the program, and many choose not 
to when they can make more money elsewhere. Presumably, the economic 
value delivered to Medicare patients is in some ways tailored to make the 
administrative payment fair to the service provider, and it therefore is fun-
damentally still a market price (albeit a possibly distorted one).
It is useful to revisit the implications of incomplete markets for federal 
7. This budget treatment did not prevent Congress from committing to spend these illusory 
gains. In assessing the sustainability of promised beneﬁ  ts, the legislation treated the equity 
premium as creating real resources. Under the act, beneﬁ  ts can be increased with higher-  than-
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budgeting and to consider whether in a second-  best world, risk adjustment 
is likely to move decisions closer to or further away from the social opti-
mum. Although it is impossible to answer this deﬁ  nitively, we believe that 
the evidence on how budget numbers are used in practice strongly supports 
the contention that risk adjustment would improve allocative eﬃciency and 
transparency.
The conclusion that risk adjustment would be beneﬁ  cial depends in part 
on the observation that the budget process aﬀects resource allocation pri-
marily by allowing policymakers to weigh the costs of alternative means 
of satisfying fairly speciﬁ  c goals—such as increasing access to higher edu-
cation or encouraging investment in alternative energy sources. For these 
types of decisions, it is easy to ﬁ  nd examples (several are described next) 
where risk adjustment reduces distortions in cost comparisons. It is much 
more diﬃcult to imagine cases where risk adjustment would distort such 
comparisons. Broader trade-  oﬀs, where the question of the social discount 
rate is more important—such as whether to raise taxes or leave more debt 
to future generations—are decided primarily through the political process, 
not the budget process.
Several examples from legislation recently before Congress illustrate the 
problems that arise when market risk is not priced in the budget (see also in 
section 3.4). In the debate over reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, 
one point of contention was over whether to increase aid to low- income stu-
dents by increasing Pell grants or by lowering the interest rate on subsidized 
loans.8 Since there is no risk charge on the loans, increasing their supply 
involves a lower budget cost than increasing outright grants of equal market 
value. Cost considerations favor loans over more-  targeted Pell grants, even 
though the latter are generally thought to be the more eﬃcient policy.9
A second example, which illustrates how ignoring risk adjustment can 
circumvent budget discipline and reduce transparency, is a provision (Title 
XVII) in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. That provision provides qualifying 
developers of innovative fuel technologies with federal loan guarantees. The 
legislation is structured so that the guarantees have zero budget cost, regard-
less of the size of the guarantee program. The zero budget cost is achieved 
by requiring the developers, most of which are subsidiaries of large utilities 
with ample access to capital markets, to pay an up-  front fee that covers the 
estimated government cost of the credit guarantee. The value of the subsidy 
is the diﬀerence between the market value of the credit guarantee and value 
calculated without risk adjustment. In fact, even though no budget cost 
would be recorded, budget analysts use market value estimates to determine 
whether the subsidies are suﬃcient to make the projects viable. Growing 
8. S. 1642 and H.R. 2669 (passed in July 2007).
9. Research suggests that grants are more eﬀective than loans in inducing low-  income stu-
dents to pursue a college education. Further, there is growing concern that high levels of student 
loan debt create ﬁ  nancial risk for students and for the government.42        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
awareness of this legislative mechanism has resulted in increasing numbers 
of proposals designed to exploit it.
Another concern arising from considerations of the second best is that the 
very limited use of discounting in the budget may favor using low discount 
rates when discounting does occur. Recall that the budget records most 
expenditures on a cash basis, with undiscounted numbers projected over 
a ten-  year window, but that credit is on an accrual basis. The conjecture is 
that by discounting the cash ﬂ  ows associated with credit transactions but 
not discounting alternative expenditures, comparisons are distorted. While 
there is no doubt that cash-  basis accounting can impede meaningful com-
parisons across alternatives with diﬀerent expenditure patterns and time 
horizons, the limited use of discounting for credit and some other long-
  lived contractual obligations tends to mitigate, not worsen, distortions 
due to timing diﬀerences.10 Returning to the example of higher education, 
consider the choice between instituting a grant program or new student 
loan program, both of which will run for ten years. The grant program 
authorizes $100 million each year for new grants. In terms of resources 
committed to students in a given year, the equivalent student loan program 
would authorize lending each year in an amount such that the incremental 
annual subsidy is $100 million. The comparable cost for each year is exactly 
what is recorded when credit is accounted for correctly on a net present 
value basis.11
In considering alternative approaches to incorporating market prices into 
budgeting for credit, an important conceptual question is how broadly to 
deﬁ  ne cost. A broad view of opportunity cost suggests using a comprehen-
sive measure of private production costs, including not only the market 
risk premium but also taxes, liquidity, marketing expenses, and so forth. 
That is, the cost is what it would cost to contract for the same service in the 
private market.12 The alternative is to focus on government production costs, 
including a risk charge. Private- sector costs can exceed government produc-
tion costs because of the liquidity advantage of the Treasury market,13 the 
exemption of Treasury debt from state and local taxes, and the fact that the 
10. Federal agencies address this limitation in part by undertaking capital budgeting exercises 
outside of the budget process to evaluate program alternatives.
11. One might still object to the mixing of accruals with cash and prefer that the budget serve 
entirely as a statement of cash ﬂ  ows.
12. The Monetary Control Act governing the charge the Fed assesses on priced services to 
depository institutions is a precedent for using a broad deﬁ  nition of opportunity cost in evalu-
ating the cost of government services. The act mandates the Fed “to recover, over the long run, 
all direct and indirect costs actually incurred as well as imputed costs that would have been 
incurred, including ﬁ  nancing costs, taxes, and certain other expenses, and the return on equity 
(proﬁ  t) that would have been earned, if a private business ﬁ  rm provided the services” (Federal 
Reserve System, Docket No. OP-  1229).
13. To the extent that the greater liquidity of the Treasury market is due to taxpayers bearing 
a ﬁ  rmer obligation to repay than available through private contracts, the savings to the govern-
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government often avoids the higher marketing and service costs typically 
incurred by private providers.14
The question of whether to use private-  sector or government production 
costs in estimating market values is not resolved by the principle of consis-
tency—the budget generally records narrowly measured production costs 
for services the government produces, but it also records the full price of 
privately produced goods and services it purchases. In practice, it is diﬃcult 
to separate out the various components of the market price of ﬁ  nancial 
transactions. Hence, estimates based on comparable market prices are likely 
to reﬂ  ect a fairly broad measure of opportunity cost, even when adjustments 
are made for identiﬁ  able diﬀerences, such as in administrative cost.
3.3.3    Alternative  Valuation  Methods
Three basic approaches can be used to incorporate market risk in the 
pricing of federal ﬁ  nancial transactions: comparable market prices, risk-
  adjusted discount rates, and options or derivative pricing. Although all 
methods should provide similar answers if correctly implemented,15 the most 
logical approach will vary with the transaction under consideration.
Comparable Market Prices
The most straightforward estimate of market cost is obtained in those 
instances when comparable products are oﬀered by competitive private 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Clearly, government purchases of publicly traded 
stocks, bonds, and other ﬁ  nancial securities fall into this category. Several 
federal credit oﬀerings also have direct market counterparts, although favor-
able government terms can crowd out private provision. Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Aﬀairs (VA) mortgages, for instance, 
are similar in terms of size and borrower credit risk to some segments 
of the private market, where prices are readily observable. Still, adjust-
ments must be made to account for diﬀerences in borrower and product 
characteristics.
Risk- Adjusted  Spreads
For direct loan programs and sometimes for loan guarantees, risk adjust-
ing the discount rate is often the most straightforward approach to estimating 
14. The higher private-  sector administrative costs generally reﬂ  ect higher service levels 
and hence a diﬀerent product than would be oﬀered by the government. Adjusting for such 
diﬀerences is consistent with reporting program costs, not beneﬁ  ts.
15. It is well established in ﬁ  nancial theory that for options such as loan guarantees, there 
is generally no single discount rate that can be applied to projected cash ﬂ  ows to obtain a cor-
rect answer. This complication is avoided using an options pricing approach, which implicitly 
incorporates the appropriate, potentially time- varying discount rate. Standard options pricing 
methods often produce cost estimates that are lower than those based on risk-  adjusted rates. 
Nevertheless, all of the approaches yield estimates closer to market value than the current 
practice of omitting all risk adjustment.44        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
market value. Risk-  adjusted discount rates are higher than comparable 
maturity Treasury rates, because they include a premium or spread that 
compensates investors for risk bearing and other costs of extending credit. 
An advantage of this method is that for direct loans, it allows budget analysts 
to follow procedures similar to those currently used under the FCRA, where 
projected future cash ﬂ  ows are discounted to present values using rates on 
Treasury securities of the same maturity. The method of risk-  adjusted dis-
count rates also involves projecting future cash ﬂ  ows and discounting them 
to the present at a maturity-  matched rate, but the rate is risk adjusted.
The risk-  adjusted spread often can be inferred from comparable market 
rates. For loans to rated corporations, loan maturity and credit rating pro-
vide guidance in identifying the expected return. For unrated companies, 
such as the small businesses served by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), bank rates on small business loans serve as useful starting points. 
Estimated spreads can be further reﬁ  ned by taking into account attributes 
such as whether the loan is collateralized and other debt obligations of the 
borrower. For consumer credit such as student loans and mortgage insur-
ance, the private market provides useful reference rates that can be further 
reﬁ  ned with information such as credit scores or collateral value. Even for 
loans that do not have a close market analog, it is possible to glean informa-
tion from market rates. For instance, a loan to a young company developing 
new energy technologies could be valued with reference to spreads on high-
  yield bonds or yields on venture capital investments in energy.
A number of caveats apply to the estimation and application of risk-
  adjusted rates. Rarely can market spreads be applied directly, and the 
required adjustments can be subtle. First, consistency must be maintained 
between cash ﬂ  ows and discount rates. The approach under the FCRA of 
estimating expected cash ﬂ  ows already adjusts for expected losses in the 
numerator of present value calculations. To avoid double counting by using 
too high a discount rate, expected losses must be subtracted from the refer-
ence market spread. For example, if the reference spread were based on BB 
bond yields, the spread could be adjusted by subtracting average realized 
loss rates on BB bonds of similar maturity.
Identifying the cost of risk from primary market spreads—those based 
on loan terms at origination—generally requires further adjustments for 
administrative costs included in the rate spread. Secondary market prices, 
when available, largely avoid this complication. However, secondary market 
prices may be aﬀected by subordination structures and other mechanisms to 
redistribute risk that also must be recognized and adjusted for.
Finally, adjustments must be made for the value of prepayment options 
embedded in many federal loans and guarantees and for prepayment options 
aﬀecting market spreads.
Once market spreads are adjusted down for expected losses, administra-
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pensation not only for market risk but also for liquidity and tax diﬀerentials. 
From a broad opportunity cost perspective, liquidity and tax diﬀerentials 
can also be considered legitimate elements of government expense. Under a 
narrower interpretation of cost, the size of tax and liquidity eﬀects must be 
estimated and subtracted to isolate the cost of market risk.
Additional care is required in using risk-  adjusted spreads to value loan 
guarantees. On a direct loan, the spread over Treasury rates results in a lower 
present value of loan payments: the loan is worth less because of market 
risk. For a loan guarantee, risk adjusting discount rates increases guarantee 
value, because the guarantor assumes the market risk. That is, calculating 
the present value of guarantee payments eﬀectively requires using a discount 
rate that is lower than the risk- free rate. This follows logically from the iden-
tity that the value of a loan with credit risk plus the value of a 100 percent 
credit guarantee equals the value of a risk- free loan. The risky loan is worth 
less than if cash ﬂ  ows were discounted at a risk-  free rate, and the guarantee 
is worth more. This relation suggests that loan guarantees can be valued by 
taking the diﬀerence between the value of a risk-  free loan with equivalent 
cash ﬂ  ows and the estimated market value of the underlying risky loan. 
However, complications arise in applying this approach for guarantees that 
cover less than 100 percent of loan value, as is often the case. The value of 
a guarantee can interact with other loan features such as the prepayment 
option, also complicating the analysis. For some loan guarantees, a concep-
tually and operationally more appealing approach is to rely on derivative 
pricing methods.
Derivative Pricing
A loan guarantee is equivalent to a put option, a derivative security that 
can be valued using well- established methods employed by private ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. The equivalence arises because the lender has the option to put 
the loan to the guarantor—the writer of the put option—at a strike price 
equal to the face value of the loan. In the event of default, it is optimal for 
the lender to exercise the option, leaving the guarantor with a loss equal 
to the diﬀerence between the loan’s face value and the amount collected in 
default.
Derivative pricing methods are often the preferred method for valuing 
loan guarantees to commercial enterprises. They are also relatively straight-
forward to apply in valuing insurance products that entail signiﬁ  cant market 
risk, such as pension and deposit insurance. The method is rarely applied 
to credit extended to individuals, however, because critical model inputs, 
such as the underlying asset value or the conditions triggering default, 
are diﬃcult to identify. In such cases, risk-  adjusted rates are likely to be a 
more reliable starting point for estimation. The choice of valuation meth-
ods used in the examples described in section 3.4 are consistent with these 
considerations.46        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
3.3.4    Additional  Considerations
The costs of modifying budget practice—including drafting and passing 
new legislation, retraining analysts, and revamping methods and models—
are a serious obstacle to the adoption of risk-  adjusted pricing for federal 
budgeting. The added complexity could also make it harder to explain budget 
estimates to nonspecialists. An approach that would partially mitigate some 
of these problems would be to concentrate analytical eﬀorts on developing 
standard models and relatively simple guidelines for valuation at the CBO 
and OMB. The results could then be disseminated to the relevant credit 
agencies, as was done by the OMB following the passage of the FCRA. The 
task of developing standard tools is made more feasible by the fact that only 
a few programs provide most of the assisted credit (see table 3.1).
3.4    Evidence
Whether it is worthwhile to incur the costs of budget reform depends on 
how serious the distortions are from ignoring the price of risk. A series of 
recent studies quantiﬁ  es those eﬀects in a variety of contexts. They also illus-
trate the potential and challenges of estimating the cost of risk for federal 
ﬁ  nancial transactions.
3.4.1      Loans and Loan Guarantees
Strikingly, some of the government’s largest credit programs—including 
mortgage insurance, small business 7(a) loan guarantees, rural utilities loans, 
and some student loan programs—appear to cost nothing or to make money 
for the government (see table 3.2). Extending the budget measure of subsidy 
cost to include the market cost of risk and other excluded factors seems likely 
to raise estimated subsidy costs and eliminate most zero and negative subsi-
dies. This is because opportunities to extend credit on terms that more than 
cover cost tend to be taken by private lenders without taxpayer assistance. 
A growing body of evidence is consistent with this expectation.
Corporate Debt Guarantees
The CBO (2004a) uses a derivatives pricing approach to valuing loan 
guarantees and compares the results with and without the inclusion of a 
market risk premium. The study looks at two similarly structured loan guar-
antees to distressed corporations: $1.5 billion to Chrysler in 1980, and $380 
million to America West Airlines (AWA) in 2002. In exchange, the govern-
ment received guarantee fees and ten-  year warrants granting the right to 
purchase shares at a ﬁ  xed strike price.
For both Chrysler and AWA ex ante, the net cost to the government is the 
cost of the guarantee less the value of warrants and guarantee fees. Uncer-
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each cost component. Following a standard binomial modeling approach 
(see CBO [2004b] for technical details), the stochastic evolution of asset 
value is modeled based on expected returns and historical volatility of assets, 
estimated from historical stock return and industry data. Default is triggered 
when asset value falls below the value of maturing debt and current liabilities. 
Table 3.1  New federal direct loans and guarantees by program, 2005 (billions of 
dollars and percent of total)
Direct Loans    
  Staﬀord and PLUS student loansa $12.9 52.4%
    Rural electric and telecommunications 4.8 19.5
  Rural  community  facilities 1.7 6.9
    Rural Housing Insurance Fund 1.3 5.3
  SBA  disaster  loans 1.3 5.3
  Other 2.6 10.6
  Total  direct  loans $24.6
Guaranteed loans
  Staﬀord and PLUS student loansa $43.3 22.6
    FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance 58.0 30.3
    FHA general and special risk 19.7 10.3
  VA  housing 22.5 11.8
  SBA  general  business 19.9 10.4
  Other 27.9 14.6
    Total  guaranteed  loans   $191.3     
Source: OMB, Analytical Perspectives, FY 2007, pp. 89–90.
aExcludes consolidation loans.
Table 3.2  Selected loan and loan guarantee subsidy rates
      Subsidy rate (%) 
Direct loans obligations
    Rural Housing Insurance Fund 14.70
  SBA  disaster  loans 12.86
    Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund 7.38
  Rural  community  advancement 6.81
  Student  loans 3.32
    Rural electric and telecommunications –0.96
Guaranteed loan commitments
  Student  loans 11.09
    Commodity Credit Corporation export 5.07
  Export-  Import  Bank 1.09
    Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund 3.27
  SBA  7(a) 0.0
  FHA,  MMI –1.80
    FHA, general and special risk –0.85
    VA  housing   –0.32  
Source: OMB, Analytical Perspectives, FY 2007, pp. 89–90.48        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
Similarly, prepayment is triggered when assets exceed liabilities, since recov-
ery would likely allow a switch to lower-  fee, nongovernment ﬁ  nancing. The 
distribution of cash ﬂ  ows to the government fans out over time, with large 
gains in states of the world where the ﬁ  rm recovers and the warrants become 
valuable and with large losses in states where the ﬁ  rm defaults and the war-
rants are worthless.16
The same statistical models for estimating the distribution of future 
cash ﬂ  ows are used for both the FCRA-  style and market value estimates, 
ensuring that the underlying cash ﬂ  ows are the same for both. Only the 
discount rates diﬀer. The FCRA estimates are discounted using a con-
temporaneous Treasury rate, whereas the market value estimates incor-
porate the price of risk implicitly through the binomial options pricing 
approach.
The inclusion of the price of market risk has a large eﬀect on the value of 
guarantees to high-  risk borrowers. For AWA, the price of risk changes the 
net value from a gain to the government of 9.8 percent of loan value to a 
loss of 11.5 percent. For Chrysler, the net loss increases from 7.2 percent to 
15.9 percent of the amount loaned. Table 3.3 shows the results for each ﬁ  rm, 
broken down into guarantee, fee, and warrant components. Risk adjustment 
increases the value of loan guarantees, because defaults tend to occur in bad 
aggregate states. Conversely, it decreases the value of warrants, which tend 
to be most valuable in good aggregate states. Two oﬀsetting eﬀects on fee 
value make the net eﬀect of risk adjustment small: prepayments reduce fees 
in good times, but defaults reduce fees in bad times.
FHA Mortgage Guarantees
The FHA operates the Mutual Mortgage Insurance program (MMI), 
which provides access to homeownership to individuals who lack the sav-
ings, credit history, or income to qualify for a conventional mortgage. Under 
this program, the FHA provides credit guarantees on ﬁ  fteen-  and thirty- year 
ﬁ  xed and adjustable rate, amortizing mortgages. The FHA charges borrow-
ers both an up-  front and annual fee for this service. To target the program 
to low-   and moderate-  income borrowers, the FHA sets limits on the dollar 
value insured.
Conveniently for valuation, the MMI program has a close counterpart in 
the private sector, and market prices are readily available. In fact, the FHA 
share of the mortgage guarantee business has declined sharply in the mid-
  2000s, as private competitors attracted an increasing portion of relatively 
low-  risk borrowers by selectively pricing below the FHA.
In a recent analysis of proposed changes in the MMI program, the CBO 
(2006a) includes a calculation of the eﬀect of market risk on program cost. 
Although comparable market prices are available, adjustments had to be 
made for diﬀerences in loan- to- value ratios, the government’s lower market-
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ing costs, and diﬀerences in the distribution of credit scores for FHA- insured 
versus privately insured borrowers.
The eﬀect of market risk on estimated subsidy cost is once again consid-
erable. After adjusting for the loan diﬀerences the CBO estimates that the 
FHA’s subsidy cost for the MMI program is 56 basis points per year versus 
a 33 basis point cost without risk adjustment. With new annual guarantee 
volume of about $40 billion, the 23 basis point diﬀerence indicates a cost of 
risk of $90 million per cohort.
Student Loans
Two of the largest federal credit programs are the Federal Family Educa-
tion Loan (FFEL) program and the Federal Direct Student Loan (FDSL) 
program. The FFEL guaranteed loans are originated and serviced by private 
lenders but are guaranteed against credit risk by the Federal Government. 
Private lenders are also assured of a gross return that is a spread over the 
commercial paper rate through payments from the Federal Government 
that make up the diﬀerence between the student loan rate and the guaran-
teed rate. The direct loan program provides funds directly from the Federal 
Government to students, without the use of a private ﬁ  nancial intermediary. 
The terms on guaranteed and direct loans are approximately the same for 
students and are generally more favorable than those available to consumers 
on nonfederal unsecured loans.
As is the case with federal mortgage insurance, a private market has devel-
oped in parallel with the federal student loan program, mostly to provide 
funds to students who have reached the federal borrowing limit. Using a 
combination of data from private and federal lenders, Lucas and Moore (see 
chapter 7 in this volume) have estimated that market risk adds 1 to 2 percent-
age points per year to the rate charged on private student loans. Using this 
estimate to calculate the cost of federal student loans adds about 8 percent-
age points to the subsidy rate for both guaranteed and direct loans.
SBA 7(a) Loans
To promote access to loan capital for small businesses, the SBA oﬀers 
loan guarantees covering 50 percent to 85 percent of principal. In ﬁ  scal year 
Table 3.3  Comparing subsidy rates, credit reform versus market 
values (percentages)
AWA Chrysler
    Credit reform   Market value   Credit reform   Market value
Warrants (21.2) (13.2) (7.9) (5.4)
Guarantee fees paid (13.8) (14.9) (1.93) (1.86)
Loan guarantee 25.2 39.6 17.0 23.2
Net government subsidy  (9.8)   11.5   7.2   15.950        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
2005, new guarantees issued by the agency totaled about $14 billion. The 
interest rate paid by borrowers on those loans is negotiated with the lender 
and appears to be about 5 percent over short- term Treasury rates (a premium 
that is hard to reconcile with historically low default rates and the substantial 
credit guarantee). Borrowers also pay guarantee fees to the SBA.
By applying an options pricing model to the SBA’s cash ﬂ  ow data, the 
CBO has estimated that taking account of market risk and recent default 
experience doubles the cost of 7(a) guarantees from 1.1 percent of the loan 
amount to 2.2 percent (CBO, 2007).
3.4.2    Insurance  Programs
Unlike federal credit, insurance is budgeted for on a cash rather than 
accrual basis. Nevertheless, multiyear analyses suggest that the cost of risk 
is signiﬁ  cant for some of these programs.
Pension Beneﬁ  t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) Insurance
The cost of federal insurance for deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans provided 
by the PBGC has two main drivers: it increases with the frequency of insol-
vency of plan sponsors and with the shortfall between plan assets and plan 
liabilities. Both of these factors contribute to higher payouts by the PBGC 
in bad aggregate states: insolvency rates increase in downturns, and the value 
of plan assets, which are heavily invested in equities, falls relative to the more 
stable value of plan liabilities. Consequently, the cost of market risk is a large 
component of the market price of this insurance.
The CBO (2005) evaluates the market value cost of insurance using an 
options pricing framework and compares it to an estimate based on identical 
cash ﬂ  ows but risk-  free discounting.17 The market value of federal pension 
insurance net of premiums for single- employer plans over the next ten years 
is estimated to be $86.7 billion. That sum includes $23.3 billion for plans 
that have already been terminated and $63.4 billion for insured claims pro-
jected to be put to the PBGC during the period. For the forward-  looking 
component of cost, discounting new projected PBGC claims at Treasury 
rates implies a present value cost estimate of $32.4 billion, or just over half 
the market value of $63.4 when the cost of market risk is included.
Deposit Insurance
Recent estimates of the cost of federal deposit insurance also indicate a 
signiﬁ  cant contribution from market risk. For example, Falkenheim and 
Pennacchi (2003) and Pennacchi (2006) develop an options pricing model 
17. The compound nature of the option is accommodated using a risk- neutral Monte Carlo 
simulation approach. The model is used to evaluate the joint probability distribution of insol-
vency and the shortfall in plan assets for each covered ﬁ  rm. The total discounted cost is then 
a sum over all covered ﬁ  rms for which data is available. Pennacchi and Lewis (1999) examine 
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for deposit insurance to banks and thrifts. To diﬀerentiate the market cost of 
deposit insurance from the expected cost discounted at risk-  free rates, they 
report and compare the risk- adjusted or “risk- neutral” cumulative ten- year 
probabilities of bank insolvency with the cumulative actual or “physical” 
probabilities of insolvency. Their results show markedly higher cumulative 
risk-  neutral probabilities of default than actual probabilities. For example, 
the average cumulative ten- year probability of insolvency for a large sample 
of private banks was 11.19 percent (risk neutral) and 4.5 percent (actual). 
For the publicly traded sample, the respective probabilities were 12.13 per-
cent (risk neutral) and 4.98 percent (actual).18
3.4.3      Investments in Private Securities
If investments in private securities were treated analogously to credit 
under the FCRA, an apparent arbitrage opportunity would arise (CBO, 
2003).19 Imagine issuing $100 billion in Treasury bonds yielding 5 percent 
and investing the money in private equities. Clearly, in market value terms, 
this is a neutral transaction for the government—equal value is paid and 
received. When the cash ﬂ  ows from the equity investment are projected into 
the future, those cash ﬂ  ows include an equity premium, conservatively, 4 
percent more than the risk-  free rate. At the end of ten years, the accumu-
lated value of the equity is then expected to be $100(1.09)10  $237 billion. 
Discounting at the Treasury rate of 5 percent, the present value of the equity 
investment is $145 billion. Under FCRA-  type accounting, the transaction 
appears to make $45 billion for the government (the $145 equity value less 
the $100 in Treasury securities issued).
Failing to take into account market risk can also distort the perception 
of the magnitude of liabilities, as discussed in Geanakoplos and Zeldes (see 
chapter 8 in this volume) in the context of Social Security. Further, an even 
larger discrepancy between market value and estimated cost can arise for 
beneﬁ  t guarantees, such as those contemplated in some proposals to sup-
plement Social Security with investments in private securities (Lachance 
and Mitchell 2002; CBO 2006b; Biggs, Burdick, and Smetters 2009). Such 
guarantees provide a ﬂ  oor on beneﬁ  ts to protect against poor investment 
returns. Like credit guarantees, beneﬁ  t guarantees are a type of put option 
that confers the right to sell an asset for a predetermined price should it lose 
value. Beneﬁ  t guarantees are particularly susceptible to market risk, how-
ever, because of the leveraged exposure to stock market risk.
Many observers inside and outside the government have emphasized 
the importance of avoiding the temptation to treat the risk premium as an 
18. The diﬀerence between actual and risk-  neutral probabilities over this horizon does not 
map directly into a cost diﬀerential, because it neglects time value, but nevertheless, it is indica-
tive of the relative magnitude of costs with and without risk adjustment.
19. At present, private investments are accounted for as cash outlays in the budget under 
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arbitrage opportunity in the budget. For instance, in describing the budget 
treatment of the private investments in the railroad retirement fund dis-
cussed previously, the OMB writes,20
Equities and private bonds earn a higher return on average than the Trea-
sury rate, but that return is subject to greater uncertainty. Sound budget-
ing principles require that estimates of future [railroad retirement] trust 
fund balances reﬂ  ect both the average return and the cost of risk associ-
ated with the uncertainty of that return. . . . [T]he diﬀerence between the 
expected return of a risky liquid asset and the Treasury rate is equal to 
the cost of the asset’s additional risk as priced by the market. Follow-
ing through on this insight, the best way to project the rate of return on 
the Fund’s balances is to use a Treasury rate. This will mean that assets 
with equal economic value as measured by market prices will be treated 
equivalently, avoiding the appearance that the budget could beneﬁ  t if the 
government bought private sector assets.
The 1999 Social Security Technical Advisory Panel21 similarly warns against 
presentations “that tend to show that ‘ﬁ  nancial arbitrage’—borrowing to 
purchase equities with a higher expected rate of return—creates some sort 
of free lunch” (p. 7). Nevertheless, agreement has yet to be reached on how 
the risk premium should be treated in the budget or in other types of govern-
ment ﬁ  nancial reports.
Opposition to booking an arbitrage proﬁ  t from government risk-  taking 
should not be interpreted as an argument against incorporating private 
investments into the Social Security system. As suggested by Diamond and 
Geanakoplos (1999), there may be legitimate reasons to reallocate risk via 
the retirement system—for instance, if some people are constrained from 
participating privately in ﬁ  nancial markets by borrowing constraints. These 
considerations are important for evaluating the relative merits of alternative 
policy proposals. Here, however, the emphasis is on accounting for cost, 
which, for the reasons discussed earlier, seems best accomplished using mar-
ket prices.
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Comment  Henning Bohn
Debbie Lucas and Marvin Phaup present an excellent overview of how 
economists and policymakers should think about risk-  taking in the public 
sector. The ﬁ  rst part reviews the economic theory of risk sharing and of how 
risks are priced. The second part applies the principles of state-  contingent 
claims pricing to practical questions of budget accounting. I agree whole-
heartedly with the two main points: taking a systematic risk has a cost to 
the government, and the market value of such risks should be reﬂ  ected in 
the budget.
The theoretical part reviews state-  contingent claims pricing—the stan-
dard technical framework for pricing risks in ﬁ  nance—in a way that should 
be readable in policy circles. The key insights are that taking systematic risks 
is costly and that options are valuable. Lucas and Phaup also discuss how 
ﬁ  nance theory can be adapted to deal with realistically incomplete markets. 
The main lessons are that public policy can improve risk sharing and that 
well-  designed risk-  sharing policies can improve social welfare.
The applied part applies state-  contingent claims pricing to questions of 
budget accounting. The key points are that assets and liabilities should be 
valued at market, that cost- beneﬁ  t calculations should be based on economic 
opportunity cost, that costs should be recognized when they are accrued and 
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